The next step to Kimberly was over the modder river. here once again, the british information was faulty and their maps even worse.
The modder was, like many rivers in the area, at the bottom of a 30 foot, steeped sided canyon.
On the north side were a number of scattered buildings, trees and bushes, normally perfect to build defensive positions. on the southern side, the side the british would come from, there was for miles around, a flat, scrub colored plain, dotted with anthills and small rocks.
The boer commander Cronje, going on what was probobly gut feeling, and almost 25 years of fighting with and against the british, put most of his eggs in one basket, and set up his defences for a frontal assault. He was not to be dissapointed.
The moral of the Free state Kommandos was rather low due to the losses at belmont and Graspan. The 400 burgers at Graspan had been reinforced by the arival of General Koos de la Rey and 2000 reinforcement burgers, to late to influence the battle, but giving De La Rey enough time to diagnose the errors.
Holding the high ground was an age old defence strategy used by armies all over the world. De la Rey argued that times had changed. Defenders firing from a hill could only use plunging fire. ie. the bullet was only dangerous at its point of impact. because it would be flying at a downward angle, it was only effective from the time it reached its target, till it hit the ground a couple of meters behind. De la Rey believed this was okay in the days of muzzle loaders and older rifles, but with a deadly range of 2200 meters, the mauser bullet was wasted. If fired at the flat trajectory, parallel to the ground, the bullet would fly the length the battlefield, and if that field was a moving mass of enemy troops, it would often find a target of opportunity, even if it missed ist aimed target.
In spite of arguments De la Rey insisted on setting up his defences on the South Bank. This was against all precedent in Boer History. Protecting their flanks and keeping their escape route open was almost biblical law for Boer Kommando tactics. To stand facing the enemy with their backs to a river was crazy in the view of the traditionalists. De la Rey insisted that the buildings and bushes on the north bank were the perfect targets for british artillery, so hated and feared by the burgers who had been shelled twice in the last 5 days in Belmont and Graspan. Using and taking cover was foreign to British regular troops and De La Rey argued, that if they built invisable trenches on the South bank, (irregualr and well camouflaged) the British would not be able to see them because of the smokless powder used by the mauser cartridges.
De la rey got his way through force of character, and with the help of a German engineer they bulit a system of well disguised trenches and foxholes on the south bank, leaving a few exposed positions on the north bank to confuse the British. Boer artillery was well hidden on the north bank, with numerous positions prepared so they could move around while firing.
On the plain in front of the south bank thez placed whitwashed stones so gunners could see the exact distances on the plain.
Once the positions were set up, the burgers, somewhat sceptical, took up positions and waited for the British to arrive....
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