just read something interesting from Panzer General(guderians book)
 

i recently bought this book (along with the rommel papers, which i havent started yet), and ive read throught the majority of the russian campaign in '41, and what i read surprised me.

i had an earlier post about if the start date of the invasion of russia wouldve been earlier would it have really helped, but after reading this, it seems that the germans couldve taken moscow from the start date on june 22.(taking moscow wouldve probably meant the end of russia)


after guderians panzer group had captured smolensk and some land to the east of it, he and his army group commander (von Bock) plead with the OKH and hitler to make the next objective MOSCOW, this was as early as August 14. instead, hitler ordered that the mass of army group center be sent southWEST (and, in essense back towards germany instead of towards moscow) to help army group south with their advance in kiev and the ukraine.

if hitler would have allowed von bock to continue the march on moscow, history mightve taken a much different course...

( the attack on moscow only started late october,and men,tanks, and supplies were running low)

History is full of "what-ifs". If one's mother had been differently equipped, she'd have been one's father. ;)

I guess Hitler's problem was, he was obsessed with space and enormous numbers of prisoners (never mind what was to become of them). The next year, he was obsessed with taking places marked out on a map (like Stalingrad). In other words, Adolf was obsessed with the wrong things at the wrong time.

Yours,
Paul

For a good next book to read, check out Guderian's son's book on the 116th Panzer Division. It traces the Windhund from Normandy to the west Wall, and the final battles in Germany. Incredible detail.

Could it have been done? Maybe, maybe not. What is important to remember is that many military personages were backpedaling as fast as possible and making certain revisions to reality in post-WW II books. This is particularly true of nazi/German commanders as they were the losers. There was a great tendency to dump all the blame on Hitler for bad decisions.
Please consider multiple sources on any issue related to strategy or grand strategy to help you develop the most informed possible opinion. Good luck and keep on reading!

Not Really. If you read Guderians book, its very instructive to note that, when faced with the same situation one year earlier in france, Guderian won the toss and drove to the english channel against Hitlers orders. Its completely valid to ask why one year later guderian couldn't repeat this.By the end of that year Hitler had sacked Guderian ; FM Von Brauchsch, FM Von Bock, FM Von Leeb Gen Strauss & Hoepner...and then siezed control of OKH. From that point on Hitler word was final and there would be no movement without his expressed permision.

THe corner stone of the german warfare system was "Auftragstaktik", where the superiors only give field commander broad mission oriented goals, leaving it to the generals to best figure out how to achieve those objectives. In May 1940 Guderian exercised this leverage to dash to the channel sealing the fate of the Allied armies, but by end of the summer of 1941 Guderian was sufficently chasen that he could not repeat the same action. Hitler saw all these generals as threats to his leadership and thus shot german in the foot. Its no accident that from that point on Germanies fortunes in the war go down hill!

Hello Paul,
You are correct regarding Guderian's actions at the time you mentioned. Yet, those same commanders failed to act against the stop order allowing the "Miracle at Dunkirk." A lack of adherence to their own principle of auftragstaktik exists here also, and the sackings you mentioned had yet to take place.
Regarding the original posting of charlie I still say maybe, maybe not. There is a train of thought that the armor of the Heer had outpaced the infantry to the point that continued aggressive moves toward Moscow may have been futile as well. And again, figuring charlie had only recently begun his exploration of WW II keep on reading.
Regards,
Dennis

Well To me the issue typifies the whole reason why German could win early in the war. The longer Hitler's control over the mechanisms of war the better germanies chances. Hitler never understood the Blitzkrieg or the importance of auftragstaktik....and the whole ploitical struggle that occured at this time. I mention the sackings at years end because its the tail end of this slide towards a political war rather than a military one. It smacks of the same micromanagement that occured in 'the Nam' that prevented victory .

When Hilter is weakened after the fall of Stalingrad , Mannstein is able to wrestle control long enought to give the soviets a real bloody nose, but once he reasserts his control over the army after the spring, Hilter fouls up operations again with micromanagement.

It seems that when left to there own devices the germans armies were almost unstoppable and would have found a way. You say that the armor infantry gap forced the halt and prevented moscow to be taken.I acknowlege the problem but still don't agree. @ Smolnensk there was a severe armor infantry gap that was over come but it only ended up costing an additional two weeks delay. As it happened the armor needed two weeks halt to recondition their 'tracks' [< 1/2 operational ==> ~ 3/4 operational] before resuming the advance. Thus that leg of the advance [>1/2 of the distance to Moscow], took 6 weeks including operational halt.

So it follows that resumption of the advance to moscow would have been completed by the September and encirlced at that time. The flanks were operationally irrellevant as Stalin would have been forced to strip away all combat power from these flanks to stop the advance on Moscow.

Paul,
You say the chances of the nazis winning declined as Hitler increased his control over the army. I would submit that as the head of state he excersized a great deal of control from day one. It was Hitler who pushed through Manstein's Ardennes attack that led to the incredible success in the west in 1940. Fortunately his commanders chose not to overturn that decision.
You do argue a strong case for success on the the eastern front in 1941, but it presupposes everything going according to plan. I submit that this cannot automatically be assumed. Heer casualties, while not as heavy as the Soviets were not light either. Each mile traveled makes the logistics tail longer, and considering the transportation network in the SU, much harder to drag.
Also, the track record of the Germans in capturing major cities is not exactly unblemished. I would submit that the attritional warfare in Stalingrad and Leningrad would have been a cakewalk compared to Moscow. Could the Germans have stood the losses? I think not, and given the much larger manpower reserves of the Soviets and corresponding loss of mobility of the Germans in an urban setting the flanks may most certainly have become very, very relevant. Come winter the Germans, IMO would have found themselves in a similar position to the Grande Armee over a century earlier.
Regards,
Dennis

Well then you understand little about the blitzkrieg. THe whole german ops were centered around sequential campaigns designed to engaded encircle and defeat the armies of their enemies to bring them to their knees. Had this been pursued in Russia to the same extent as in France they would have disarmed Stalin and left the Soviet leadership vulnerable since it require soldiers to remain in power. Notice that the Germans didn't have to seige and fight much for Paris, why? Because the French and allied armies had already been defeated. Its very difficult to survive in a city [even a large one] if its completely cutoff from any source of supplies. Leningrad and Stalingrad became the quagmires because neither were encircled.

If you want to speak of the economics of war ....'all roads lead to moscow' and its extremely difficult to conduct any kind of mechanised war without control of the transportation system . The Germans had their own ability to produce their own oil , but they were unwilling to pay the cost...so much for Hitlers understanding of the econmics of war.He bluffed his way into the war and tried to bluff his way through it aswell.The German economy was quit abit bigger than the soviet economy the soviet economy very nearly collapsed in mid 1942 any way as a result of the dislocation and losses of 1941. Had the german hit them much harder and dislodged Stalin from Moscow, you would have had a collapse within the soviet union. Infact Stalin reportedly opened negotiations with the Germans through the ROmanians in the fall of 1941 to bring about a surrender! These events could easly have snowballed and it could have been visions of 1917 all over again.

Stalins agents doomed Hitlers plans.
 

Stalins agents in switzerland and japan had advanced knowledge of both the German and Japanese intentions for most of the war. Once Stalin was assured of Japans neutrality vs. the Soviet Union he transferred the bulk of the Siberian Divisions to the defence of Moscow thereby dooming the center thrust towards the capital. had Japan been able to hide her intentions better then perhaps the Nazis had a chance.

Panzer forward

panzerboy39